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Sympathy and the Non-human: Max Scheler’s Phenomenology of 
Interrelation 
 





 German phenomenologist and sociologist Max Scheler accorded sympathy a central role in his 
philosophy, arguing that sympathy enables not only ethical behaviour, but also knowledge of 
animate and inanimate others. Influenced by Catholicism and especially St Francis, Scheler 
envisioned a broad, cosmic sympathy forming the hidden basis for all human values, with the 
“higher” religious, artistic, philosophic and other cultural values enabled by a more basic regard 
for non-human nature and  insights gained from the human situation within the non-human world. 
Sympathy for the non-human is thus both integral and fundamental to the cultivation of other 
values in the development of both the human person and humanity in general. 
 
Scheler’s concept of sympathy is valuable for contemporary animal ethics because it insists on 
acknowledgement of and respect for difference as constitutive for the experience of sympathy. By 
thus allowing for sympathy to occur in the absence of complete knowledge of other subjectivities, 
Scheler’s phenomenology of sympathy eliminates the need for complete understanding of the 
consciousness of other animals as a prerequisite for interspecies sympathy. Despite their inability 
to completely inhabit non-human perspectives, humans can thus sympathize with other creatures. 
  
While Scheler is a foundational thinker and, to a large degree, maintains hierarchical structures 
contested by many contemporary animal theorists, he remains a valuable source for contemporary 
theory insofar as he acknowledges a “fundamental basis of connection” between species and 
affirms that all animal bodies are communicative. The occasioning of sympathy by gestural 




Sympathy for other animals is not a “special interest” 
province of philosophy, is not a sidecar to ontology or 
ethics. Rather, understanding animals is a crucial key 
to philosophical anthropology in a post-Darwinian, 
ecologically conscious era. Scheler’s philosophy of 
sympathy is valuable because it provides a point of 
entry into the experience of animals, which can lead 
to a more humane and sustainable future for life on 
Earth. This essay will analyse Scheler’s philosophy of 
sympathy, with special concern for human/animal 
interactions, and conclude with some suggestions as 
to how this phenomenology of sympathy can mobilize 
concern for the extra-human orders of nature, arguing 
throughout that concern for the extra-human is also 
deeply humanitarian.  
 
Beware the child who burns ants with a magnifying 
glass, the now widely recognized wisdom goes, 
because cruelty to non-human creatures results in 
abusive human relationships later in life. This 
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realization has a precursor in Max Scheler’s careful 
phenomenological description of sympathy. Scheler 
underscored the importance of sympathy with nature 
in the formation of human morality: human 
sympathy, he argues, is impossible without concern 
for all forms of life, including plants and other 
animals. Scheler’s concept of sympathy or “fellow-
feeling” resolves many problems in environmental 
and animal ethics, as it eliminates a major stumbling 
block when it comes to ethical treatment of animals: 
the notion that humans can never fully understand 
what it is like to be a non-human animal and therefore 
cannot enter into moral relations with them. Scheler 
resisted concepts of sympathy that rely on some form 
of mental substitution or reconstruction from prior 
experience that enables the sympathetic response by 
the sympathizer. Similarity of experience is not a pre-
requisite for inter-human sympathy, nor is it 
necessary for sympathy with other animals. Using St 
Francis as an example, Scheler even holds open the 
possibility that one can sympathize with inanimate 
nature. By holding open the door to sympathy as 
widely as possible, Scheler articulated a philosophy 
that was ecologically aware and yet appreciated the 
significant differences between humans and other 
creatures. 
 
Until recently, Scheler enjoyed little of the 
posthumous attention that contemporaries like 
Heidegger and Sartre received, partially due to Nazi 
censorship of his writing as well as the relatively slow 
publication of the complete works (Frings, 1998, p. 
271). The recent upsurge in scholarly interest in 
Scheler’s work corrects the gap between Scheler’s 
writing and the available secondary literature. Several 
recent commentators have shown how Scheler’s 
personalism improves upon neo-Kantian rationalism 
in developing an ethics that precedes logical 
constructions. Manfred Frings (1998) argues that 
Scheler’s extension of Pascal’s “ordre du coeur” in 
his value ethics is a correction to rational moral 
calculus in that it precludes the possibility of thinking 
of ethics in terms of cost-benefit analysis. The actions 
that one “ought” to do can and should be determined 
not only by a reasoned internal dialogue, which is 
actually secondary to the properly ethical sphere, but 
also by emotive factors linked to a scale of values and 
a radical personalism (Frings, 1998, pp. 272-274). 
John Crosby stresses this radical individuality in 
Scheler’s ethics as one of its strong points: each 
person has moral requirements that are completely 
unique, because each individual possesses a distinct 
essence which can properly be called an essence 
despite its dependence on biological and social factors 
(Crosby, 1998, p. 26). Dennis Weiss (1998) stresses 
Scheler’s role in reconciling the human person in 
relation to its disparate descriptions in the sciences: 
philosophical anthropology is in the unique position 
of articulating a unified picture of human nature that 
draws from these disciplines (the social and “hard” 
sciences) without being overwhelmed by them. While 
Weiss faults Scheler for drawing too strong a division 
between the matter and the spirit of the human, he 
recognizes that Scheler’s “wholeness task” is relevant 
in a time in which humans are beginning to recognize 
commonalities between human intelligence and the 
capabilities of other animals and even machines 
(Weiss, 1998, pp. 239, 247). These recent discussions 
reveal how Scheler breaks with the Kantian tradition 
by insisting on moral obligations that relate to 
individual personality and emotional states, by 
breaking with the demands of formal duty ethics in 
favour of intuition and sympathy, and by situating 
humankind within extra-human nature while yet 
claiming human distinctiveness. 
 
Efforts to apply Scheler’s work to a variety of ethical 
situations outside the bounds of phenomenology 
demonstrate the viability of sympathy to transcend 
subject-object boundaries (Gallagher, 2004; 
HaCohen, 2001; Jeffreys, 2006; Reilly, 2006). 
Richard Zaner (2003), for example, examines real and 
fictional instances of extreme disability occasioned by 
stroke and battlefield trauma and the ways in which 
severely disabled people are able to reach outside 
themselves through the sympathetic link with a 
caregiver. Zaner describes how magazine editor Jean-
Dominique Bauby lost almost all of his motor 
functioning after a massive stroke (2003, p. 188). 
Able to move only his left eyelid, Bauby 
painstakingly dictated his memoire using a letter chart 
and sequences of blinks. Bauby’s loss of his usual 
ability to communicate with family and friends was 
maddening, but, if it had not been for the sympathetic 
attention of his caregivers, even that fragile thread of 
communication would have been lost. It would have 
been easy to have missed that one fluttering left 
eyelid; it would have been easy to have discounted its 
series of blinks. A “readiness to listen” is constitutive 
for the experience of sympathy, and such care and 
concern has not only ethical but also epistemological 
significance (Zaner, 2003, pp. 201-203). Sympathy is 
a precondition for knowledge of other subjects. For 
Scheler, “the heart has a place even in the knowing 
operations performed by persons, even to the point of 
making them possible at all” (Crosby, 1998, p. 39). 
Human beings know each other and themselves by 
acts of sympathy that take place in co-responsibility 
(or what Merleau-Ponty called intersubjectivity or 
even “interanimality”), and without this “fellow-
feeling”, the human intellectual/ emotional world is 
impoverished (Crosby, 1998, p. 39; Merleau-Ponty 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 7, Edition 2 September 2007  Page 3 of 9 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
 
1964/1968, p. 172; Scheler, 1912/ 1979). Failure to 
sympathize with other creatures is failure to 
understand them, and failure to understand them is 
failure to understand ourselves. 
 
The term “sympathy” was used by Max Scheler as a 
blanket term for the host of states explored in Wesen 
und Formen der Sympathie (1912). In choosing the 
term “sympathy” (Sympathie) as the “generic term” to 
encompass such diverse notions as Mitgefühl (fellow-
feeling), Mitleid (pity, commiseration), Einfühlung 
(empathy), and even Cosmovitale Einsfühlung 
(defined as “identification, etc. with the ... Cosmos”), 
Scheler gave priority to sympathy, signalling that the 
diversity of states described in the book are all 
variations of sympathy, or different rooms within the 
house of sympathy (Scheler, 1912/1979, p. liii). That 
said, Scheler does articulate his own theory of 
sympathy, which seeks not only to describe the 
different types of sympathy, but also to understand 
how the diversity of sympathetic experiences are 
possible at all. Scheler situates the experience of 
sympathy within the development of the human 
person and humanity in general, giving sympathy an 
absolutely central role. Before turning to these larger 
implications, Scheler must explain what he means by 
sympathy and how sympathy takes place. 
 
Throughout his writing, Scheler works to preserve 
difference as a foundational part of the experience of 
sympathy: sympathy need not form an ecstatic union 
between two people nor convey positive knowledge 
about another’s inward state. Scheler argues against 
theories that would blur the boundaries between 
individuals or between people and the natural world. 
His careful, methodical parsing of terms is an 
expression of this concern for preserving the integrity 
of human subjects and non-human entities. In his 
theory, sympathy is not a transfer of another’s 
experience into my own consciousness, nor is it a 
reproduction drawn from my own experience in order 
to approximate the other’s experience. Scheler 
preserves a sphere within the other that remains 
unknown to me, that is forever private and enclosed, 
which he refers to as the “permanent limit of 
advance” (1912/1979, p. 71). Sympathy can advance 
to the boundary of that inner realm, but never beyond. 
For Scheler, the knowledge conveyed by sympathy is 
metaphysical, not strictly “data”, in that it is a 
realization, on my part, that the other possesses the 
same hidden inner life that I also possess. The foreign 
subject then becomes not only relatively equal 
(“relatively real”) to me but actually equal 
(“absolutely real”) (1912/1979, p. 59). The reason 
Scheler spends so much time separating arguments 
based on emotional “infection” and “vicarious re-
enactment” (1912/1979, p. 42) from sympathy proper 
is that he sees that, in order for sympathy to remain 
genuine, it must preserve both the foreign nature of 
the other and my own wilful capacity to sympathize. 
Scheler reserves the label of sympathy for cases in 
which I feel for another despite my inability to really 
know what the other person is experiencing. 
 
Scheler even goes so far as to say that the “truer” the 
sympathy, or fellow-feeling, the less reproduction - 
understood as an interior rehearsal or representation - 
happens in the person sympathizing. In the experience 
of sympathy, I am so involved in feeling for the other 
that I do not reconstruct what the other might be 
feeling on the basis of my own experiences, or, 
worse, recount a story of my own to make the other 
feel better (1912/1979, p. 47). If reproduction were 
necessary for sympathy, I would have to have had the 
experience of drowning in order to sympathize with a 
person who is drowning. I need not go through a 
process of deliberation or ask myself how the other 
person might be feeling in order to sympathize: 
sympathy happens on a more basic, visceral level and 
only secondarily results in a reconstruction of the 
foreign subjectivity in my own terms. Sympathy 
operates on an intuitive level for Scheler, working in 
concert with the bodily organism. His explanation of 
gesture is crucial for understanding his theory of 
sympathy and would later inspire Merleau-Ponty, 
whose discussion of gesture in the Phenomenology of 
Perception is directly indebted to Scheler (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/2002, p. 214 & note 13). 
 
In gesture, the expression is given simultaneously 
with the object, such that clasped hands mean 
“please”. “It is in the blush that we perceive shame, in 
the laughter joy” (Scheler, 1912/1979, p. 10). We do 
not have to go through a process of interpretation to 
know what these bodily configurations mean. 
Gestures are not signs that refer to something else; 
rather, the sign itself is the signified (Scheler, 1912/ 
1979, p. 10 & note 1). In this way, Scheler avoids 
overly rationalistic, disembodied analyses that would 
place our comprehension of others in a mental 
formula of reconstruction. He cites the example of 
babies recognizing their mothers’ pleasure or anger as 
evidence that no process of extrapolation need take 
place for the understanding of gesture (Scheler, 1912/ 
1979, p. 12). Just as a baby does not need to mentally 
reproduce its mother’s perceived mental states in 
order to understand her joy or displeasure, fully 
developed human beings can also sympathize with 
their fellow human beings and with other animals 
based on the signing activities of the body. These 
outward “signs” are not separate from the inner states 
which they “represent”. Scheler insists that this is no 
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question at all of “re-presentation”: the frown is the 
sadness or anger, and it is in this fleshly medium that 
both the “sender” and “receiver” correspond. Such 
“correspondence” does not imply, as in a letter, a 
message encoded, sent and received, but rather the 
sense of paralleling one another. The frown itself is 
thus the medium through which the two interact, with 
or without the mental processes that accompany this 
event or attempt to reproduce what the other might be 
thinking. 
 
It is important to note Scheler’s exclusion of 
reproduction - the imaginative rehearsal of another’s 
inward state - from genuine sympathy, because it has 
consequences for the scope of sympathy’s reach. If 
sympathy is based on my own experiences, and not 
those of the other, it is not sympathy at all, but an act 
of introspection. Sympathy based entirely on intro-
spection must thus be a contradiction, in that 
sympathy must necessarily reach beyond solipsistic 
analysis and attend to the other. Beyond this 
objection, my ability to sympathize would be greatly 
limited if sympathy depended upon reconstruction, 
because I could only sympathize with those sharing 
similar experiences to those I’d already had, or with 
those sufficiently similar to myself that I could 
extrapolate from my experiences to make up the 
difference. If sympathy is primarily cognitive and 
primarily reproductive, the picture that emerges is a 
pastiche of various memories that achieve a 
simulacrum of what I believe the other person might 
be experiencing. Having said this, Scheler does not 
believe that reproduction is without value. Surely 
people do draw from their own experiences in order 
to understand others. Scheler only wishes to place 
reproduction, however valuable it might be, in a 
different category from sympathy itself. Reproduction 
may take its place alongside fellow-feeling and 
understanding as among those phenomena that allow 
us to “enlarge” our own lives and “transcend” our 
own limitations (Scheler, 1912/1979, p. 49). In his 
theory, sympathy acts as a kind of leading edge in the 
understanding of an/other; without this sympathy that 
goes beyond my capacity to reconstruct the other’s 
inward life, it is doubtful that any further attempts to 
understand would be made. 
 
Just as Scheler wants to preserve the boundaries 
between individual humans, he also works to preserve 
the distinctions between humans and the natural 
world. Scheler’s concern is not that humans might 
anthropomorphize nature and thus think that they 
could sympathize with animals. On the contrary, 
human beings are already “cosmomorphic” (Scheler, 
1912/1979, p. 105), made of the same stuff as the 
“natural” world, and discussion of the human already 
entails a discussion of the natural. The “cultivation of 
human nature”, then, requires a cultivation of 
identification with nature in general, a task which 
Scheler regards as “the first task of our educational 
enterprise” (ibid.). Realizing the interconnections 
between humans and the natural world on an intuitive 
level is foundational for Scheler, the basis for all 
humanitarian values. We might expect, then, that 
Scheler would agree with any theory that might 
bolster his case for greater human identification with 
the natural world, but he does not. For example, 
Scheler believes that Nietzsche mistakenly identifies 
certain negative human emotions on seeing the 
suffering of animals, such as “seeing a fowl’s neck 
wrung”, as fellow-feeling. Scheler sees this as an 
example of a form of selfishness masquerading as 
fellow-feeling, in which it is unpleasant for me to see 
the sight of blood, to see the dead bird, and so forth. 
In my selfishness, the pleasure or pain of the other is 
actually masked by my own sensitivities (1912/1979, 
p. 41). 
 
Scheler does not believe that we can have access to 
the sensory experience of animals. This would not be 
an obstacle to fellow-feeling in and of itself, because 
Scheler associates sensory experience not with 
fellow-feeling but with reproduction. The more pure 
the fellow-feeling, then, the less the sensory element. 
While not having access to the sensory lives of 
animals could thus be said to heighten the possibility 
of fellow-feeling with them, Scheler categorically 
states that “fellow-feeling is no longer operative in 
such cases” (1912/1979, p. 48). However, he goes on 
to say, somewhat contradictorily: 
  
Nevertheless so far as the various modes of 
vital feeling are concerned, understanding 
and fellow-feeling are able to range 
throughout the entire animate universe, 
even though they rapidly fall off in respect 
of specific qualities as we descend the 
organic scale. (1912/1979, p. 48) 
 
This passage indicates Scheler’s ambivalence about 
extending fellow-feeling to animals, an ambivalence 
which interpreters of Scheler need not share. In light 
of his concern for preserving the differences between 
animals and humans, Scheler interpolates the term 
“vital feeling”, but falls short of adopting it as a 
separate category, in that he says that, in this respect, 
fellow-feeling is operative. Insofar as he feels that 
human identification with nature is necessary for 
identification with other humans, he feels an 
attraction towards including animals in fellow-
feeling, albeit with the qualification that it is only in 
respect of a “vital feeling”. Despite his ambivalence, 
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Scheler does say that, in our dealings with animals, 
we do have access to the (non-sensory) experiences of 
animals, and this is via what he calls a “universal 
grammar” or a “fundamental basis of connection” 
(1912/1979, p. 11). This takes place in much the same 
way as we understand human gestures. To extend this 
portion of Scheler’s argument further than he does 
himself, we can tell when an animal is afraid because 
it cowers, that it is in pain because it cries out. By “as 
we descend the organic scale”, Scheler is saying that 
this basis of connection becomes more tenuous as we 
get to animals that are further removed from 
ourselves. However, the connection is not completely 
absent so long as we remain within the sphere of 
animate living creatures. 
 
Although Scheler does not delineate them, he 
discusses fellow-feeling, or something akin to it, on at 
least three levels: between humans, between humans 
and animals (bracketing certain false types, as in 
Nietzsche’s case), and between humans and the 
inanimate natural world (for example, St Francis 
calling a flame his “brother”). At every point, Scheler 
tries to preserve the distinctions between the 
sympathizing person and the “object” of sympathy, 
because, for him, “fellow-feeling does not presuppose 
essential sameness but essential difference” 
(1912/1979, p. 65). Although this position runs 
counter to the claims of some proponents of animal 
rights who say that animals should be protected 
because they are essentially the same as human 
beings, Scheler’s theory shows that difference need 
not be an obstacle for  -  and, indeed, is constitutive of  
-  human concern for the other. 
 
Concern for difference is also at the heart of his 
critique of theories of “metaphysical monism”, which 
posit one spiritual substance underlying the whole 
universe. Regarding it as representative of this type of 
view, Scheler negates Schopenhauer’s notion that pity 
gives us access to the one self-negating will that 
underlies our illusory, individual selves (1912/1979, 
pp. 51-54). Bergson’s “élan vital” and Plato’s “world-
soul” are critiqued along similar lines (1912/1979, pp. 
63, 82). Such theories cannot help to explain 
sympathy, because they portray a fusion of 
individuals into an underlying impersonal mass. 
Sympathy, which is feeling of one for another, 
becomes impossible in such a metaphysic. (Scheler 
says that his own metaphysical claims for sympathy 
lead him to theism, but it would be a panentheistic 
sort of theism that would not fuse God with the 
world.) Here again, Scheler maintains a distinction, 
this time between God and the universe. 
 
As has already been stated, Scheler believes that 
identification with nature is the point of entry into 
other, “higher” modes of connection, such as 
sympathy between humans and human love of God. 
Scheler stridently criticises Western culture for 
imagining that it could bypass a sense of connection 
with nature and still cultivate the other human values. 
However, Scheler’s own presentation of the issues 
still, at times, works within the framework of human 
dominance over nature. For example, Scheler 
envisages a continuum of types of identification 
moving hierarchically from union with nature all the 
way to love of God: 
 
Thus among all the forms of sympathy and 
varieties of love, the sense of vital unity 
with the cosmos stands, so to speak, at the 
opposite pole to the non-cosmic love of 
persons, founded upon the love of God. All 
the other forms lie, as it were, in stages 
between them. Those who seek to ascend 
this scale [italics added] will surely fall if 
they insist upon taking the second step 
before they have made the first. (Scheler, 
1912/1979, p. 129) 
 
This might at first seem to be an improvement on the 
Aristotelian chain of being so prevalent in the West, 
in that it speaks of a movement from one pole to 
another, but, even in this passage, Scheler describes a 
“scale” which can be “ascend[ed]”. Scheler also 
speaks elsewhere of “higher” and “lower” faculties 
(1912/1979, p. 104), of which identification with 
nature seems to be lower. While Scheler does make 
the first step, as it were, obligatory, the structure of 
his thought still falls within the dominant paradigm, 
and, therefore, undergirds human domination. Scheler 
elsewhere excoriates Aristotle’s philosophy for 
making the relationship of master and slave seem 
“natural”, but his own implied hierarchy 
accomplishes the same thing for the relationship 
between human and non-human. He claims that he 
does not, like Plato and Aristotle, see humanity as the 
“glittering apex of Nature’s aristocracy” (1912/1979, 
p. 79), but traces of this view remain in his writing. 
 
Despite the revolutionary nature of Scheler’s critique 
of Western culture, he still never imagines the 
possibility that identification with nature could be the 
“apex” of human sentiments, or that love of God 
could serve as the point of entry into an appreciation 
of nature rather than the other way around. So long as 
appreciation of nature remains primal, basic, and 
identified with non-Western marginal cultures, it will 
continue to be devalued. Nevertheless, Scheler’s 
argument would certainly bring up short those who 
think that nature could somehow be bypassed 
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altogether, as somehow irrelevant to human life. 
 
So far, we see how Scheler preserves a strong sense 
of difference as absolutely foundational for the 
experience of sympathy. The sympathizing person 
must not imagine that he or she really understands 
what the suffering person or animal is experiencing; 
this kind of presumption violates the integrity and 
uniqueness of the Other and substitutes or erases the 
other’s difference for a reconstruction based on the 
would-be sympathizer’s prior experience. In truly 
sympathetic encounters, no imagined or real fusion 
takes place within the minds of the two partners in the 
encounter. They remain separate entities throughout 
the encounter, but this does not prevent the moral 
choice or act of sympathy from taking place. The 
body communicates its pleasure or pain, and this 
communication can be apprehended by others; but 
this knowledge is never exhaustive, nor does it 
necessarily elicit the sympathetic response. No one 
will ever understand another’s experience to the 
extent that it is possible to understand one’s own 
physical and emotional states. While there is a certain 
truth in the adage that “your friends know you better 
than you know yourself”, the transparency that 
characterizes our relations with others does have 
limits. Sympathy happens when, on the basis of 
admittedly partial information, the sympathizer 
knowingly feels for another, passionately attending to 
the pain of this other who remains mysterious 
throughout the event. 
 
Scheler’s philosophy is valuable for animal ethics 
insofar as it means that humans need not have an 
exhaustive understanding of how animals experience 
the world in order to sympathize with them. While it 
is true that objective knowledge of an animal’s 
interior state is impossible (just as it is impossible to 
have such knowledge of another human’s interior 
state), the gestural significations of animal bodies 
convey enough information about their interior states 
to justify the sympathetic response. The ethical 
decision to sympathize has its basis in a prior order of 
signification, Scheler’s “universal grammar” of 
gesture. It is this prior signification that makes 
sympathy possible, and even religious feelings appear 
as articulations or folds within the intersubjective act 
of gestural recognition. 
 
Scheler’s cautions about preserving difference and yet 
insisting on certain continuities between the animal 
and the human are key contributions to contemporary 
animal ethics. The social contract and utilitarian 
approaches favoured in the animal rights discourse of 
previous decades simply extended an already 
inadequate moral calculus to include animals as 
participants in an overall economy of pleasures and 
pains, interests and duties (McReynolds, 2004, pp. 
63-85). This approach, favoured by theorists like 
Peter Singer and Tom Regan, inevitably ran into 
problems when human rationality became the fulcrum 
upon which sympathy for animals and extension of 
rights to animals rested (Acampora, 2006, p. 73; 
Bailey, 2005, p. 2). By an over-reliance on rational 
argumentation for animal rights, theorists in animal 
rights (perhaps unwittingly) re-entrenched themselves 
in a Western essentializing tradition that made an 
invidious comparison between human (male) 
rationality and animal (female) passion. As Cathryn 
Bailey writes, “Reason did not first come into 
existence and then look for a venue to exhibit itself; 
rather, what much of philosophy came to define as 
reason only came into being as a result of denying 
and quashing those attributes regarded as feminine or 
bodily” (2005, p. 4). The vitriolic denial of relational 
and emotive capacities in Western philosophy on the 
discursive level obscured and sanitized the violence 
perpetrated against women and animals on the fleshly 
level (Bailey, 2005, pp. 4-6; Merchant, 2001, pp. 68-
70). Ethical speculation authorized this violence while 
at the same time covering its tracks through appeals to 
universal reason. 
 
Recent attempts to reformulate animal ethics have 
sought not only to question the unfounded dualism 
between human and animal, but also to question the 
dominant role that a narrow conception of rationality 
has played in philosophy (see, for example, Abram, 
1996; Acampora, 2006; Hamington, 2004; Light & 
Katz, 1996). Animal ethics, then, becomes a shift 
from moral ratiocination to embodied relationality 
and insists that formal reflection arises from the lived 
body and returns to engaged contexts of meaning. The 
animal rights and animal liberation perspectives that 
arose in the 1970s (with roots in the 18th and 19th 
centuries) are now being challenged by pragmatist 
and Continental thinkers who emphasize the semiotic 
role that the body plays in the formation of meaning 
and then seek to think in terms of the human body’s 
significant interrelations with non-human entities. 
With this return to the corporal, experiential-
existential dimension of interrelatedness with others, 
current pragmatist and phenomenological theorists 
hope to avoid the over-reliance on rationality found in 
Animal Rights and Animal Liberation theorists. 
 
Scheler’s philosophy has much to contribute to 
current discussions of animal ethics, not only as an 
important source for Merleau-Ponty’s theory of 
embodied perception, but on its own merits. Three 
trajectories of Scheler’s philosophy of sympathy 
outlined above can clarify human thinking about 
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animals and human relationships with animals. First 
of all, Scheler insists that sympathy with non-human 
nature is foundational for other forms of human 
feeling. Religious feelings, for example, have their 
basis in the impulse to sympathize with animal and 
human others, and without this “fundamental basis of 
connection”, all “higher” human aspirations and 
ideals collapse. Notice here that Scheler continues to 
operate within a hierarchical and foundational 
construction that would be distasteful to many 
contemporary animal theorists. Scheler does posit a 
hierarchy of values, but, careful thinker that he is, 
Scheler does not imagine that sympathy for non-
human nature can simply be by-passed on the way to 
higher, more philosophical modes of reflection. For 
Scheler, human beings are “cosmomorphic”, and that 
means that they cannot simply extricate themselves 
from embodied relationality. Sympathy with non-
human nature is built into the very structure of human 
being, and ignoring the impulse to sympathy comes at 
the cost of being less human. Religious and 
philosophical values of love and justice collapse like 
a house of cards if they do not allow for sympathy at 
this most basic level.  
 
A second valuable attribute of Scheler’s philosophy is 
that it acknowledges that sympathy need not be based 
on a reconstruction from prior experience. Human 
beings need not know what it is like to be another 
animal in order to sympathize with that creature, just 
as they need not know what it is like to be another 
human being in order to sympathize with him or her. 
Knowledge of other subjectivities is never exhaustive 
and only provides clues to that person’s or animal’s 
“interior” state. Strictly speaking, the interior/exterior 
dichotomy falls apart, and gesture provides a linkage 
between these two modes of knowledge. Claims to 
knowledge of another subjectivity are always partial, 
and would-be sympathizers should recognize that 
they do not have exhaustive knowledge of another’s 
thoughts, feelings, and intentions. This part of 
Scheler’s philosophy is critical, because, without a 
certain epistemological humility, sympathy can go 
awry by failing to attend to the differences that 
separate species.   
 
Would-be sympathizers overstep the bounds of 
sympathy when they assume an exhaustive 
knowledge of the other. I think right away of Werner 
Herzog’s recent documentary, Grizzly Man (Beggs & 
Herzog, 2005), in which an errant naturalist, Timothy 
Treadwell, supposes that he can save Alaskan grizzly 
bears by communing with them. Although Treadwell 
displays an uncanny knowledge of the gestural 
“language” of the bears, a fact which no doubt kept 
him alive longer than would otherwise have been 
possible, he allowed himself to believe that his 
knowledge was somehow exhaustive and would 
shield him from harm. Inasmuch as Treadwell 
believed himself to be one of the bears, Scheler would 
say that Treadwell did not sympathize with them, 
because sympathy must be a feeling for the other 
despite real difference between the subjects involved. 
The film shows Treadwell, in his own video footage, 
talking to the huge creatures in a patronizing sing-
song voice, standing mere inches away from the 
animals while imitating their gestures. Failing to 
attend to the wildness of the bears and his own status 
as an invader of bear habitat, Treadwell allowed 
himself to become too complacent in his dealings 
with the animals, which tragically brought about his 
own death and the death of his girlfriend, Amie 
Huguenard. The two were attacked, killed and eaten 
by an unfamiliar group of bears who had wandered 
south in search of food. The bears were subsequently 
killed by rangers. In watching the documentary, one 
cannot help but think that Treadwell crossed a 
boundary, that he forgot that bears and humans are 
not the same. Scheler would suggest that sympathy is 
not a simple fusion of two subjectivities or a return to 
a primal unity, but is, instead, a feeling that can only 
exist when difference is acknowledged and preserved.   
 
A third valuable aspect of Scheler’s philosophy for 
contemporary animal studies is his emphasis on 
sympathy as a moral act occasioned by pre-rational, 
bodily communication. Scheler insists that it is 
perfectly possible for human beings to understand the 
pain of others, human and non-human, without 
therefore being affected by that understanding. The 
attention to the bodily, affective dimension in recent 
philosophical treatments of animals is no doubt an 
improvement upon the stance of the detached 
observer that plagued Animal Rights perspectives. 
Scheler, however, might caution that, without the 
moral act of choosing to sympathize, bodily 
knowledge accomplishes nothing in the active, 
political sphere. Animal theorists must, in addition to 
delineating the corporal crossings of species 
boundaries, enflesh those theoretical perspectives 
with reflection on concrete situations, as Ralph 
Acampora does in his treatment of zoos (2006, pp. 
95-115). Phenomenology attends to the dimension of 
lived experience, and, in addition to arising from 
reflection on the lived world, it must return to that 
lived world. Animal ethics must respond to the 
summons that it invokes and thus avoid stances of 
pure reflection and attend to creatures.  
 
Although Scheler retains a hierarchical attitude 
towards nature and situates humanity and human 
values above non-human nature, his philosophy 
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remains valid, because it does not view sympathy 
with the non-human as an optional step on the way to 
care for other humans or love of God. He also 
acknowledges the sphere of corporal knowledge to be 
later elucidated by Merleau-Ponty, but does not rely 
on gestural forms of communication to do all of the 
work of ethics. The knowledge of the other that 
begins at the lived, gestural level must be carried into 
the existential, ethical decision to sympathize. This 
fundamental sympathy with the non-human then 
becomes the basis for other human values. Scheler’s 
philosophy is valuable because it speaks to those who 
would not want to espouse positions of animal rights 
or animal liberation. Even those who remain within 
an anthropocentric, essentialist stance can recognize 
that sympathy for animals develops the traits and 
characteristics normally valued in members of human 
society (such as caring, concern and cooperation). 
The treatment of animals in a society serves as a 
“canary in the coal mine” for the well-being of all of 
its members, and the capacity for sympathy that is 
preserved for animals will be preserved for humans as 
well.  
 
Those working in contemporary animal studies will 
find in Scheler’s philosophy a welcome voice, one 
that emphasizes the interconnectedness of all 
creatures without therefore lumping species together 
in a homogenous fashion. Scheler’s attention to 
difference avoids metaphysical monism that would 
posit of an actual fusion between sympathizing 
subjects. Sympathy is valuable because it operates 
even in the midst of the extreme diversity of species 
on Earth. Despite the vast differences that separate the 
canary from the gorilla, the cicada from the whale, 
and the salamander from the human being, facets of 
gestural communication still operate between those 
species. When that understanding is viewed 
sympathetically, the possibility arises for a politics of 
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